- Jurisdictional REDD+ (JREDD+) has been a climate finance mechanism under the UN for nearly two decades. In Brazil, JREDD+ is a public policy approach developed by Brazilian federal and state governments to promote large-scale forest conservation and climate mitigation.
- Emission reductions are measured at the jurisdictional level—not tied to individual properties or collective territories—and generate carbon credits based on verified drops in deforestation and degradation.
- Participation is voluntary and protected by safeguards and law, ensuring communities, farmers, and local actors can opt in or out while retaining land and resource rights. JREDD+ enables access to climate finance from private and public sources, with benefits distributed to rural sectors and credits issued only after independent verification.
- The views expressed are those of the authors, not necessarily Mongabay.
Misconceptions about jurisdictional REDD+ programs have been amplified in recent press coverage, such as reports by Climate Home News and Mongabay. This analysis aims to clarify key aspects of JREDD+ to contribute to a more accurate and informed public debate.
Jurisdictional REDD+ Is Not New—In Brazil or Globally
Jurisdictional REDD+ (JREDD+) is not an experimental approach. It began to be formally discussed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2005, with the first decisions on the mechanism adopted in 2007 during COP 13 in Bali.
Through the Bali Action Plan, the Parties to the Convention recognized the need to support developing countries in reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation—REDD is the acronym for this phrase—as well as the role of conservation, sustainable forest management, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks—the ‘plus’ in REDD+.
Brazil was the first country in the world to create a JREDD+ program, establishing the Amazon Fund in 2008—as the first results-based REDD+ financial mechanism, designed both to receive payments and to channel resources through benefit-sharing, supporting forest conservation and sustainable development. The country then established its National REDD+ Strategy and the National REDD+ Commission in 2015.
At the subnational level, Acre and Mato Grosso states created legal frameworks for REDD+ in 2010 and 2013, respectively. Both have received REDD+ payments under the REDD+ for Early Movers (REM) Program supported by Germany and the UK. These experiences are part of Brazil’s long-standing commitment to climate and forest governance.
What’s New: Broadening the Sources of Climate Finance
To date, most REDD+ financing came from results-based payments in Brazil through the Amazon Fund, the REDD for Early Movers (REM) contracts with AC and MT, and a Green Climate Fund contract with the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change via the UN Development Program. These payments have come in the form of voluntary donations from developed countries based on verified reductions in deforestation and emissions, as recorded in Brazil’s REDD+ results submissions to the UNFCCC through the Lima REDD+ Info Hub.
However, only around 4% of Brazil’s verified results (emissions reductions) have actually been compensated. The current challenge is not the lack of performance, but the limited scale of available public finance. As a result, Brazilian states have begun exploring a complementary, market-based path: the certification and sale of jurisdictional carbon credits, through robust international standards such as ART/TREES. This approach allows for broader participation by private actors and coalitions like LEAF while maintaining environmental integrity.
This represents an evolution in the financing model—not in the REDD+ mechanism itself.
Jurisdictional REDD+ Is Fundamentally Different than Private REDD+ Projects
There is a growing narrative that lumps jurisdictional REDD+ (JREDD+) programs together with private REDD+ projects, especially in critiques of the voluntary carbon market. However, these are fundamentally different approaches—and it is critical to distinguish them.
JREDD+ programs are public policies implemented by governments. They monitor emissions across entire jurisdictions—states or countries. JREDD+ values changes in the flow of carbon at the jurisdictional level—i.e., reductions in overall emissions from deforestation and forest degradation—not carbon stocks. JREDD+ allows for private forest carbon projects at the level of individual private properties or traditional territories.
Unlike JREDD+ programs, private REDD+ projects operate within relatively tiny geographies such as a farm or a community territory. Projects estimate their climate benefits based upon counterfactual baselines—estimates of what might happen without the project. These assumptions often lead to credit inflation and have been the subject of growing scrutiny, including in peer-reviewed studies such as Guizar-Coutiño et al. (2022) and West et al. (2023).
In JREDD+, the government assumes the costs and responsibility for program design, as well as for the measurement, reporting, and verification of results, which are achieved through public policies implemented by the jurisdiction and stakeholder-specific subprograms. These subprograms offer positive incentives for forest conservation and protection, or for strengthening environmental enforcement capacity. What matters in JREDD+ is the aggregate performance of the jurisdiction in reducing deforestation. In contrast, in private REDD+ projects, developers and participating communities enter into long-term contractual obligations and take on direct project-level risks, including binding land-use agreements—with no guarantee that deforestation will not simply be displaced to other areas.
The Vast Majority of JREDD+ Credits Do Not Come from Traditional Territories
JREDD+ is designed to support developing countries with large forest areas facing increasing deforestation pressures. Payments are made to jurisdictions—not to individuals, communities, or companies—as recognition of their climate mitigation efforts.
In this context, it is important to clarify that JREDD+ results—and, consequently, JREDD+ credits—are not based on the stock of forest carbon in specific areas or across the jurisdiction as a whole. Instead, results and credits are based on verified reductions in emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, compared to a historical baseline (reference level). To generate credits, the jurisdiction must demonstrate a measurable decline in emissions over time, in accordance with rigorous methodologies. In other words, the mere existence of well-preserved forests or high carbon stocks does not, by itself, generate credits.
Historically, most REDD+ results have been achieved through state-led command-and-control efforts. While there is a growing effort to transition toward models based on positive incentives and shifts in the rural development model, the enforcement of environmental laws remains a key factor in reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Recognizing this reality is essential to understanding why governments hold both the responsibility for and the legal title to JREDD+ credits.
JREDD+ Does Not Reward Those Who Deforest the Most
JREDD+ was designed to intervene in agricultural frontiers, where the expansion of farming and ranching—and land grabbing—are driving high levels of deforestation and forest degradation emissions. However, through benefit-sharing strategies—funded by revenues from credit sales—the historical role of Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities as forest stewards is recognized.
The generation of JREDD+ credits requires measurable reductions in emissions from both deforestation and forest degradation. Therefore, territories with historically low deforestation rates—especially Indigenous lands and protected areas—while playing a crucial role in maintaining forest cover, typically do not generate large volumes of reductions simply because deforestation in these areas is already minimal.
According to the Annual Deforestation Report in Brazil (RAD 2024), published by the MapBiomas initiative, only 1.3% of all deforestation in Brazil in 2024 occurred within Indigenous Lands. That same year, 57,252 hectares were deforested inside Conservation Units (UCs), representing approximately 4.6% of total deforestation. Within strictly protected areas (federal and state-level Protection Units), deforestation totaled just 4,564 hectares, accounting for only 0.37% of the national deforestation figure.
Nonetheless, JREDD+ in no way neglects forest carbon stocks. Benefit-sharing strategies under these programs consider not only emission reductions and increased removals by regenerating forests (carbon flows), but also forest conservation and historical forest protection (carbon stocks). Additionally, they take into account other elements, such as deforestation and degradation drivers, the effectiveness of benefit allocation in reducing emissions (which contributes to the generation of more credits), and the territorial characteristics of each jurisdiction.
The benefit-sharing strategies of programs like the Amazon Fund, REM Acre, and REM Mato Grosso demonstrate that Indigenous Peoples, traditional communities, family farmers, and rural producers in general are among the main beneficiaries of these initiatives. These strategies recognize both the role of those who contribute to the conservation of standing forests and those who help reduce deforestation and promote sustainable land use.
Thus, while verified emission reductions trigger payments to the jurisdiction, the internal allocation of benefits aligns with broader REDD+ goals and reflects the 3Es principles of benefit-sharing—equity, efficiency, and effectiveness.
Jurisdictional REDD+ Does Not Threaten Territorial Rights
JREDD+ does not value carbon per se, but rather changes in the flow of carbon—i.e., verified reductions in emissions from deforestation and forest degradation—at the scale of an entire jurisdiction, such as a state or province. The mechanism operates based on aggregated territorial performance and does not assign emission reductions or credits to specific properties or community areas.
As such, JREDD+ does not require any contractual commitments by landholders or communities. It does not impose land-use obligations, and does not alter land tenure or legal rights. Landholders and communities remain fully autonomous in the management and use of their territories and natural resources, provided such use complies with existing environmental regulations. These are pre-established legal norms—not new requirements introduced by JREDD+.
As previously mentioned, this public policy approach has been under development in Brazil for nearly two decades through programs such as the Amazon Fund, REM Acre, and REM Mato Grosso. These initiatives demonstrate that it is possible to implement REDD+ mechanisms at scale without triggering systemic territorial conflicts or legal disputes; they have not been the subject of persistent or widespread complaints related to land-use restrictions or violations of territorial rights. This stability reflects the strength of operating through public institutions, within existing legal frameworks, and with safeguards focused on benefit-sharing and participation.
REDD+ Resources Matter—Participation Is Ongoing
While REDD+ funds may not be large enough to transform entire state budgets, they play a meaningful role in supporting forest-friendly rural development and promoting more sustainable land-use practices. Based on the implementation of programs such as the Amazon Fund and REM, benefit-sharing has been largely directed toward Indigenous Peoples, traditional communities, smallholder farmers, and grassroots organizations—segments that are often underserved by financing mechanisms coming from broader public policies.
Contrary to claims suggesting that REDD+ aims to replace essential public services such as health or education, the mechanism has a distinct and complementary role. REDD+ is not a substitute for the state’s obligation to secure fundamental rights. Rather, it provides financial and economic incentives to support practices that contribute to emissions reductions and forest conservation, and it helps ensure the permanence of results already achieved. This is, in fact, one of the seven Cancun Safeguards: the need for actions to promote long-term benefits and avoid reversals.
Additionally, the expansion of jurisdictional REDD+ programs has prompted more structured and inclusive participation processes—such as public consultations, participatory forums, technical committees, multi-stakeholder oversight bodies, and regional workshops. See, for example, the long-standing partnership between Indigenous Peoples and the Government of Acre, including the creation of multi-stakeholder governance bodies such as CEVA, which has contributed to participatory planning and benefit-sharing under the SISA.
Participation is evolving and deepening, especially in jurisdictions still shaping their JREDD+ frameworks. It is also important to recognize the proactive engagement of Indigenous leaders and organizations in these efforts. Sweeping generalizations that “no one was consulted” risk disregarding the legitimate work of those who are actively building inclusive programs from within.
The Right to Say No: Voluntary Participation in JREDD+ Is Protected by Safeguards and Law
Participation in jurisdictional REDD+ (JREDD+) programs is voluntary by design. These programs are grounded in international safeguards—such as the Cancun Safeguards under the UNFCCC. Participation is not mandatory: landholders, communities, and project proponents retain full autonomy to decide whether or not to engage in the program. In Brazil, this principle has also been reinforced through national and subnational frameworks that allow for the formal exclusion of areas from jurisdictional accounting, ensuring respect for territorial rights and self-determination.
However, private projects must be nested into the jurisdictional system to ensure carbon accounting consistency and avoid double counting. This is not only a legal requirement under Brazil’s emissions trading framework but also a safeguard required by international rules and standards like the UNFCCC and ART/TREES.
When a project is nested, the emission reductions and corresponding credits attributed to it must be excluded from the jurisdictional accounting system to prevent double counting. Also, these areas should not be included in the benefit-sharing arrangements of JREDD+ programs, as the revenues from their respective credit sales have already been allocated to them. Including them would amount to double compensation, undermining fairness toward other communities and territories within the jurisdiction that do not have individual projects.
Finally, the nesting process also requires methodological alignment. Many private projects operate under different standards and accounting rules. Harmonizing these with the jurisdictional approach ensures credit comparability and reinforces the integrity of all REDD+ results as a whole.
Conditional Agreements Are Not “Advance Sales” (which are prohibited)
Under Article 43, §6º of Brazil’s emissions trading system Law 15.042/2024, advance sales of REDD+ credits are prohibited when they involve a firm obligation to deliver future credits before verification and issuance. This means that unconditional, upfront transactions involving non-existent credits are illegal. However, the law explicitly permits conditional contracts—agreements whose execution depends on the prior verification and certification of emission reductions by an approved standard, such as ART/TREES.
This distinction is critical: credits that do not yet exist because they are pending verification cannot be treated as commodities. Unlike commodities, verified REDD+ credits lack immediate liquidity and fungibility, and thus cannot be freely transferred in advance. Therefore, only conditional transactions—where the sale is suspended until verification occurs— are legally permissible. Even when a fixed price is referenced, suspensive clauses make clear that payment and delivery are contingent on independent verification.
The legal challenge is the distinction between prohibited advance sales and permitted conditional contracts, but no final judicial ruling has been already set in this context (Munhoz, 2025). Overly restrictive interpretations risk undermining Brazil’s leadership and participation in jurisdictional carbon markets—without advancing environmental integrity or legal certainty.
Conclusion: A Strategic Policy to Unlock Climate Finance
Jurisdictional REDD+ is not just a theoretical mechanism— it is a strategic climate policy. It has the potential to unlock large-scale, performance-based funding for forest jurisdictions, aligning local development with global climate goals.
By scaling up from isolated projects to jurisdictional approaches, JREDD+ ensures greater transparency, avoids perverse incentives, and enables coordinated public planning. Its implementation in Brazil has been based on legal frameworks, public institutions, and international standards.
In a time when the world urgently needs scalable solutions to deforestation, JREDD+ offers a legitimate, science-based, and participatory pathway forward. For it to succeed, it must be understood on its own terms—not through the lens of misinformation, oversimplification, or false equivalence.
The authors are all affiliated with the Earth Innovation Institute
Banner image: River in the Amazon rainforest. Photo by Rhett Ayers Butler.
